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I. DEEDS
A. Construction

Before 1949,1 a tenancy by the entireties could be created in

Tennessee only as it was at common law 2-by the presence of the four
4
unities, time, title, interest, and possession.3 In Dobbins v. Dobbins,

the grantor conveyed in 1941 a certain parcel of land to himself and
his wife, reciting in the deed that they were in fact husband and wife.
The grantor predeceased his wife. On her death, her son by a prior
marriage brought a partition action against his brother and the
grantor's only daughter. The chancellor held that the wife of the

grantor took the property in fee under the deed and thus on her
death her two sons took as the only heirs. The Tennessee Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that a person cannot convey to himself. But
an attempt to do so does not make the deed void if there is another
grantee capable of taking. The court based its decision on Hicks v.

Sprankle,5 which held that where a husband and wife conveyed to
themselves land belonging to the wife, the fact that the wife was
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee and Illinois Bars. The
author wishes to express his thanks to Mr. William Hume Barr, a student in the School
of Law, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. In 1949, a statute was enacted to permit a husband to convey to himself and
his wife as tenants by the entirety if his intent is explicit. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 64-109
(1956).
2. See 4 POWELL, REAL PRoPERTY 653 (1964).
3. Holt v. Holt, 185 Tenn. 1, 202 S.W.2d 650 (1947).
4. Tenn., Oct. 11, 1963 (unpublished opinion).
5. 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S.W. 1044 (1923).
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incapable of taking from herself would not vitiate the deed and the
husband would thus take title to the property.
It is a fundamental rule of construction that the court should attempt
to determine and give effect to the intent of the grantor. 6 The part
of the deed in the instant case which appears to clearly indicate the
grantor's intent is found in the granting clause:
For and in consideration of the love and affection, that I, Henry H. Holloway, entertain for my beloved wife, Francis Holloway, I have bargained

and sold, and by these presences do transfer and convey unto the said
Francis Holloway, and Henry H. Holloway, (husband and wife) their
heirs
(Italics added.) 7
and assigns, a certain tract or parcel of land ....

From this granting clause it seems certain that the intent of the
grantor was to create survivorship rights in the property through the
creation of a tenancy by the entirety. In fact, the usual form by which
such concurrent ownership is created is a recital in the deed that the
grantees are husband and wife.8 Thus, in holding that the heirs of
the wife who had been predeceased by her husband were entitled to
the property in question, the court implemented the grantor's intention. If the facts had been somewhat different, however, would the
court's reasoning that the wife took a fee simple title to the property
because her husband could not convey to himself create a result as
congruent with the grantor's intention as was that of the instant
case? For example, if after the conveyance the wife had predeceased
her husband, being survived by children of a previous marriage,
would the wife's heirs take the property to the exclusion of the husband? On the other hand, if the wife sold the land to a bona fide
purchaser after the conveyance, would the husband have any right
to the proceeds? It is suggested that a proper decision in such cases,
following the rationale of the instant case, could only be reached
by impressing the land or the proceeds therefrom with a constructive
trust in favor of the grantor. A grantor is entitled to restitution
when as a result of a mistake of law he has conveyed to his wife or
another a greater interest in land than he had intended to convey,9
and such restitution may take the form of a constructive trust held
by the grantee or his heirs for the benefit of the grantor. 10
6. Id. at 314, 257 S.W. at 1045.
7. Supra note 4.
8. 4 PowELr, REAL PROPERTY 656 (1964).
9. REsTATmmrr, RFsrrtrnoN § 49 (1937).
For an analogous situation, see
White v. White, 190 N.E.2d 102 (Mass. 1963), where a mother transferred shares
of stock to the names of herself and her son as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and both understood that she was to retain complete ownership, but that he
should be in a position to advise her. It was held that she could compel the son to
transfer the shares to her, since otherwise he would be unjustly enriched as a result
of a mistake of law.
10. Strout v. Burgress, 144 Me. 263, 68 A.2d 241 (1949). See 4 ScoTr, TRusTS
§ 465 (2d ed. 1956).
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However, it is suggested that an alternative rationale might be more
generally applicable. As stated above, it is fairly certain that the
grantor in the instant case intended to create a tenancy by the
entireties with right of survivorship. He failed to achieve this result
because the four unities were not present. The majority rule is that
when the law of a state denies the grantor a right to create either a
joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety between himself and another by direct conveyance, such conveyance creates a tenancy in
common between the grantor and his intended joint tenant or his
spouse." Moreover, since the intention to attach a right of survivorship to the property seems plainly intended, and the supreme court
has before construed a similar deed so as to create a tenancy in
common with a right of survivorship attached,'2 if the court in the
instant case had held that the deed created a tenancy in common with
a right of survivorship, any problems similar to those suggested
could have been properly dealt with under the trust rationale.
In Bell v. Hackler,13 another case construing a deed having to do
with tenancies by the entireties, a widow brought an action against the
decedent's children by previous marriages for homestead rights and
dower interest in property owned by decedent during his life.
Decedent and a previous wife had received the land in question
through a deed naming them grantees "as tenants by the entireties
during their natural lives and during the life of the survivor of
them . .."14 and then to their heirs. The defendants claimed under
the decedent as his heirs, alleging that by the terms of the deed they
would take upon the death of the survivor of the two, in this case
the decedent. The supreme court agreed, holding that the decedent
had only a life estate in the land after the death of his previous wife
and this interest thereby terminated on his death and went by descent
to his children; the widow of the second marriage therefore received
nothing.

During the period of this survey, it was reaffirmed by the court
of appeals that the Tennessee courts are committed to avoiding whenever possible, construction of a deed calling for application of the
statute abolishing estates tail.15 In an action to enjoin the defendants'

going upon the property and a decree that plaintiff owned the
property in question, the children of the grantor, Rosalie Cox Shrum,
11. Strout v. Burgress, supra note 10, at 284, 68 A.2d at 254. The court went
on to say that the only two cases which have held contrary are Hicks v. Sprankle,
supra note 5, considered by the court as controlling in the instant case, and the
case on which Hicks v. Sprankle relied, Cameron v. Stevens, 9 N.B. 141 (1858).
12. Runions v. Runions, 186 Tenn. 25, 207 S.W.2d 1016 (1948).
13. 365 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1963).
14. Id. at 901.
15. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 64-102 (1956).
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under whom both complainant and defendant claimed, were made
parties to the suit.' 6 The grantor had obtained the property from
her father, who retained in himself a life estate, to her mother for
life, and then to Rosalie and her heirs with a reversion if she had no
heirs. Complainant had a lease on the land with an option to purchase
which he allegedly exercised and obtained a deed which he never
recorded. By parol evidence the grantor rebutted complainant's
allegation, testifying that she never intended to deed him the land
but thought that she had signed only a rental agreement. Defendant
Alexander then purchased the land for only a portion of its value
and recorded the deed. Before purchasing he made inquiry but found
no deed to complainant recorded, and the grantor told him that she
owned the land. The court of appeals, middle section, held that the
later, recorded deed took over the prior, unrecorded deed of complainant 17 and construed the original deed to Rosalie from her father
as vesting in her a life estate with a contingent remainder in her heirs.
The pertinent language in the deed was: "Burton Cox reserves a life
interest in the tract of land and at his death to Rosalie Cox and her
heirs, if any, and if she dies without bodily heirs, it is to revert to
the heirs of Burton Cox .... .18
Judge Shriver stated that courts
today look at the intent of the grantor rather than the technical
meaning of the words; and, therefore, the recorded deed of defendant
Alexander being valid, Rosalie only conveyed to him her life interest
in the property. In construing a deed, as in the construing of most
legal instruments, a court is searching for the intent of the grantor
or maker. The court should concern itself only with the grantor's
intention, 19 determining that intent by all that the grantor has
20
written irrespective of the sequence or placement of the clauses.
The instant case follows the case of Butler v. Parker,2 ' in which the
Supreme Court of Tennessee sought to determine the intention of the
grantor rather than to hold to the old interpretation placed upon
technical words requiring application of the statute abolishing fee
tails.2 2 This is done because an application of this statute reduces the
hope of issue of the first taker to the bare expectancy of an heir
16. Gregory v. Alexander, 367 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).

17. See 6 PowEri, REAL PnOPERTY 276 (1958), where it is stated that the fact
of recording protects the recorder from all prior unknown and unrecorded instruments.

18. 367 S.W.2d at 297.
19. Hutchinson v. Board, 194 Tenn. 223, 250 S.W.2d 82 (1952).
20. See Roady, Real Property-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND. L. REV. 1368,
1378 (1958).
21. 200 Tenn. 603, 293 S.W.2d 174 (1956).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-102 (1956).
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and results in a situation not unlike that which existed at common
law with respect to the Rule in Shelley's Case.
B. Suit To Set Aside Deed

In Hinton v. Robinson,4 the action was to set aside a deed by
which Mrs. Mattie Potts, deceased, conveyed a remainder interest in
her home to defendants who were relatives, when she had told
complainants that she would convey the property to them for services
rendered and had later devised the property to them. A decree of
insanity against the deceased grantor had been adjudged void, but she
had executed the deed to defendants prior to the nullifying judgment.
Complainants asserted that the deed was void because of the judgment of insanity and also grantor's actual incompetency at the time
of execution of the deed. The preponderance of the evidence, however, showed that she was competent at the time of conveyance
and that she subsequently ratified and confirmed the deed. The court
held that from the evidence the grantor was competent when she
executed the deed and the insanity decree being a nullity, the conveyance was valid and the complainant's suit was dismissed.
C. Restrictive Covenants

In a suit for declaratory judgment as to whether construction of a
house on a re-subdivided lot would violate restrictive covenants
applicable to a residential subdivision, the supreme court held that
where restrictive covenants contain no express restriction against a
re-subdivision of any lots, they will not be extended by implication
to prevent re-subdivision. 25 The subdivision had been approved by
the local planning commission and properly recorded, the lots ranging
in size from one to four acres. There were several restrictive covenants
governing setback lines, cost and type of buildings that might be
erected, a limitation to residential use, and a limitation of only one
dwelling on any lot. The recorded plat, however, by certain language,
allowed a re-subdivision of the lots with the approval of the planning
commission. Mr. Justice Felts, in holding for the complainants, stated
that restrictive covenants will be enforced according to the intent of
the parties, however, since they are contrary to the right of unrestricted use of property, the covenants will be strictly construed and
nothing will be implied beyond their clear and express prohibitions.
Since the record plat provided for approval of re-subdivision, the restriction of only one dwelling on a lot referred to either the original
23. See Roady, Real Property-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1188
(1957).
24. 364 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
25. Turnley v. Garfinkel, 211 Tenn. 125, 362 S.W.2d 921 (1962).
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lots or to approved, re-subdivided lots. It is probably accurate to say
that there is a trend in the American courts toward a recognition of the
fact that conditions can develop which will justify a court in refusing
to enforce restrictive covenants. The court in the instant case affirmed
this trend in Tennessee by stating that "a conveyance of the lots by
reference to a recorded plat raises no implied covenant that the lots
shall remain as shown on the map, or that they may not later be
subdivided." 26 This decision may be contrary, however, to the holding of the court in Hackett v. Steele,27 in which it was held that
grantees in a subdivision with a general plan and restrictive covenants
28
can enforce them against any other grantee.

II. TrrLs
A. Easements
In Smith v. Pickwick Electric Cooperative,29 cooperative members
brought an action against an electric cooperative for an injunction
seeking to restrain it from taking easements over complainants' lands
without compensation and to require it to provide complainants with
electric power. The defendant required everyone applying for membership, which amounted to purchasing electricity from it, to contractually bind themselves to the by-laws of the cooperative, which
among other things granted easements over members' lands without
cost to the cooperative. A dispute arose as to the location of a
transmission line across complainants' property, resulting in complainants' refusal to grant an easement and defendant's refusal to provide
electricity. In initiating suit, complainants obtained a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to furnish electricity, and in so
doing, it damaged complainants' property. Complainants claimed
that the by-laws were unconstitutional in requiring members to grant
easements without just compensation. The chancellor in McNairy
County denied the relief sought, but the court of appeals reversed,
holding the by-law to be unconstitutional. The supreme court,
reversing the court of appeals, held that such a by-law is reasonable
and members must abide by it under a contractual obligation, but
just compensation in the form of monetary damages will be awarded
when the cooperative unjustifiably damages a member's property.
In another case concerning easements, Rogers v. Murfreesboro
Housing Authority,30 plaintiff-landowners had executed a right-of-way
26. Id. at 923.

27. 201
28. See
(1957).
29. 367
30. 365

Tenn. 120, 297 S.W.2d 63 (1956).
Roady, Real Property-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. Rav. 1188, 1197
S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. 1963).
S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
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deed conveying an easement to the State of Tennessee for the construction of a highway and had received much less than the value of

the property, expecting a certain part of the property to be returned
to them unused. After construction of the highway was completed,
however, the state quitclaimed the unused portion to the defendant
housing authority which began to use the property for its own purposes. The evidence showed that the only title the defendant had
to the property was the quitclaim deed from the state. In this action
to recover damages for the taking of real property, the court of
appeals, middle section, held for the plaintiffs, stating that the action
of the state in quitclaiming the unused property to defendant
amounted to an abandonment of its estate in the property and a fee
simple title reverted to the plaintiff. A determinable easement exists
only so long as the specified purpose for which it is granted is possible
and is being pursued.31 The original owner of condemned property
can recover ownership of that property if he can show abandonment
of the easement taken by the condemnor.32 Of course, action by the
condemnor inconsistent with his desire to use the easement is strong
evidence on the question of abandonment.33 Thus, evidence, as in
the instant case, of execution of a quitclaim deed is sufficient to show
that the condemnor was abandoning his interest and that the fee
simple title has reverted to the original landowner.
Where the description in a conveyance shows the conveyed property to be bounded by streets owned by the grantor, the grantee
acquires an easement with respect to such streets even though the
conveyance does not expressly create an easement in the streets and
the streets have not been dedicated to public use. 4 In an action to
enforce the opening of streets bounding lots conveyed to complainants,3 5 the deeds executed by defendant-grantor and her husband
contained a description of the property which included a description
and location of two unnamed streets bounding on the lots. These
streets were the only means of ingress and egress to one of the lots
in question. The defendant attempted to sell some of the lots and
recorded a new plat. The lots sold included the property designated
for streets in the original plat and in the deeds to complainants.
The chancellor granted relief limited to monetary damages, but the
court of appeal reversed, holding that monetary damages alone would
have constituted impermissible private eminent domain. The court
31. 3 PoWL, REAL PoPEaRTY 488 (1952).

32. Trautman & Kirby, Real Property-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV.
921, 939 (1954).
33. 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 496 (1952).
34. Id. at 412, citing numerous cases.
35. Baker v. Butler, 364 S.W.2d 916 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).

REAL PROPERTY

1131

stated that the grantees of the lots by deeds from a subdivider, reciting that the lots are bounded by streets, are entitled to a decree
restraining the subdivider or his successors from conveying any part
of the land occupied by the streets, even though there has been no
dedication to or acceptance by the city, and that such a conveyance
amounted to a dedication of the property designated as streets to
the public use. (The supreme court affirmed and denied a writ of
certiorari.) When the owner of land conveys a portion of his property
which is entirely surrounded by his lands and those of strangers, a
right of access over the conveyor's land is usually found even if it
is not recited in the deed as in the instant case. 36

B. Actual Possession as Notice to Purchaser
In Henderson v. Lawrence,37 the complainant had become the

owner of a certain tract of land by inheritance and had been in
continuous possession since 1930. In 1953, she conveyed the land
to her common-law husband's son with the agreement that she
would continue to live on the land during the rest of her life. In
1962, the son's wife conveyed to defendants after having obtained
title by a divorce decree. Defendants demanded possession and the instant suit was brought to enjoin them from interfering with complainants possession. It was alleged that the original conveyance was
obtained by fraud and that complainant had thought she was executing a will when she signed the deed. On appeal to the supreme
court from a dismissal on demurrer, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings since on the face of the pleadings
admitted by demurrer the defendants knew both of the alleged fraud
and of complainant's actual possession, and such actual possession
was sufficient notice to the purchaser to put him on inquiry as to her
rights in and to possession of the property. It has been held, contrary to the instant case, that where a grantor remains in possession
and his grantee shortly thereafter conveys to a third person, the
ultimate purchaser is under no duty to inquire as to the basis for his
remote grantor's possession, for the remote grantor is barred from
claiming in derogation of his own deed.38 Possession, however, by
a person not the record owner is a large source of inquiry notice, since
the purchaser takes the land subject to any rights of the occupier
which might be disclosed by a reasonable inquiry.39
36. 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 414 (1952).

37. 369 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1963).
38. See 6 POWELL, REAL PRoPERTY 288 (1958).
39. 4 AMERcAN LAw OF PROPmETY § 17.12 (Casner ed. 1952).

However, § 17.14

gives an example whereby some courts have made an exception to the above rule by
saying that the purchaser is not put on notice.
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III. EMINENT DommN
A. Right to Incidental Damages

If all of the land covered by a lease is taken under eminent
domain in fee simple absolute, the majority of American jurisdictions
hold that the lease ends and the lessee is entitled only to the net
value of the estate condemned, that is, the value of his unexpired
term in excess of what he would have had to pay to the lessor for
the interest in the property.40 The Tennessee Court of Appeals
considered the condemnation of part of a leasehold estate in Gallatin Housing Authornity v. Chambers.41 In this condemnation proceeding the defendant landowner had a parcel of property of which
plaintiff had condemned approximately one fifth. The other defendant, Kop-Ron Corporation, a boat manufacturing concern, had
a lease on the property with seven years remaining. The rent which
Kop-Ron paid was much less than the leasehold since the corporation had made extensive additions and alterations to the land for
use in its business. The primary problem was that of valuation of
the leasehold estate. The trial court awarded, in addition to the
value of the property condemned, incidental damages to the owner
and the lessee as compensation for the damage resulting from the
partial taking of the whole tract. The damages awarded for the leasehold taken were very low, and from these awards defendant Kop-Ron
appealed. The court of appeals, middle section, held that these
awards were inadequate and modified the judgment. In so doing
he said:
While . . . the recognized rule is that the total compensation to be paid
for a tract of land condemned cannot exceed the unincumbered fee and this
total compensation must be apportioned between the reversioner and the
lessee according to their respective interests, this is not to say that the
amount of incidental damages to the lessee and owner is restricted to the
42
market value of the land taken where only a part of the tract is condemned.

He further stated that "while the amount of these damages can-

not exceed the value of the remaining property, they are in addition
to the general damages to which the parties may be entitled by
reason of the taking of a part of the property."43 In so holding,
the court followed another recent Tennessee decision, Moulton V.
George, which held that it must be made clear to the jury that
the value of the leasehold and incidental damage thereto must
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See 2 PowELL, RF-w PoriTy 287 (1950).
50 Tenn. App. 441, 362 S.W.2d 270 (M.S. 1962).
Id. at 452-53, 362 S.W.2d at 275-76.
Id. at 452, 362 S.W.2d at 275.
208 Tenn. 586, 348 S.W.2d 129 (1961).
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be deducted from the value of the fee and incidental damages
thereto.45 The court in the instant case has followed the majority
view that since the lease, and the lessee's obligation to pay rent, is not
terminated by the partial taking, the tenant is entitled to the value
of his leasehold including the present value of the rent reserved on
the part taken and restoration damages.46
B. Value of Fee and Leasehold
In another condemnation proceeding dealing with the valuation
of damages for the taking of a fee and a leasehold, the state, acquiring land for highway purposes, averred in its petition that the
amount to which the owners were entitled was 114,863 dollars. 47
Since the owners had very little beneficial interest in the land except
for its market value, it was the lessee, Knoxville Concrete Pipe Co.,
who would suffer the greatest damage. The state informed the
lessee that the value of the property and the fights thereto had been
determined to be 104,393 dollars, the remainder being the value of
the fee owner's interest. The lessee thereupon filed a motion accepting the state's valuation and asking the clerk of the court to
pay to it the determined amount. The fee owner excepted to the
allowance, claiming it would prejudice his rights at trial. The court
held that, inasmuch as all parties agreed to the amount allowed to
the lessee and the state in its petition did not separate the value of
the interest of owners and lessee, the lessee would be permitted
to withdraw such amount as allocated by the state's appraisers without waiting for a trial as to the owner's allowance and such withdrawal would not affect owners' rights at trial. It has been previously
held in Tennessee that when possession is demanded of a lessee, he
is not bound to resist a taking in which he might choose to
acquiesce. Having surrendered possession, he is entitled to payment
of his separate award which he has chosen to recognize. 48 If some
method of allocation of condemnation awards were provided in the
49
lease, litigation like that in the instant case could be eliminated.
C. Determinationof Area Condemned
In Brannan v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,50 a landowner brought suit to enjoin AT&T from using a radio microwave
45. See Roady, Real Property-1 9 62 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. RTEv. 839,
852 (1962).
46. 1 AimmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.54 (Casner ed. 1952).
47. State v. Burkhart, 370 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1963).
48. Stapleton v. State, 195 Tenn. 144, 258 S.W.2d 736 (1956). See Trautman &
Kirby, Real Property-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAN. L. REv. 921, 938 (1954).
49. See Roady, Real Property-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 839, 851
(1963).
50. 210 Tenn. 697, 362 S.W.2d 236 (1962).

1134

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 17

relay tower on land condemned by the company in a prior eminent
domain action on the grounds that the tower was higher than
authorized by the previous judgment and the microwaves were
being sent in a different direction than anticipated. Complainant
asserted that this additional height of the tower and the change in
direction of the microwaves made his land valueless for the erection
of other towers for television relays. The question was whether
the prior judgment was valid; and if so, what limitations were
placed on defendant's use of the land. The court held the judgment
valid, and that AT&T had obtained the broadest possible rights for
using the land and the sending of radio signals was not an actionable
trespass or invasion of property.
D. Liability of City for Land Condemned Within Its Borders
The state brought an action in State v. Holland,5 1 to enjoin an
action at law by a mortgagee against the City of Dayton for the
value of a mortgage which he held on land that had been condemned by that city. The state had paid the owner of the property
the amount allowed him under the condemnation decree, and the
owner had remained silent as to the existence of any encumbrances
against his land. The mortgagee had not been made a party to the
condemnation action; and although he knew of the proceedings, he
did not intervene. The court of appeals for the eastern section denied the state's injunction and held that a mortgagee is not required
to come forward and disclose his lien upon learning of condemnation proceedings against the property so incumbered, but he may
bring separate action to recover the amount of the mortgage either
from the mortgagor or from the condemnor, even if the mortgagor
has been paid the full value of the property. The court said that
a constructive trust is raised when necessary to justify the ends of
justice; and in the instant case, the owner of the property held the
value of the mortgagee's lien in trust since it was the owner's duty
in all good conscience and honesty to inform the court of the
encumbrance. The court held, moreover, that the state was subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee against the owner of the fee.
This decision is in line with the majority that holds that any person
who has the power to take by eminent domain is privileged to take
mortgaged land, but the condemnation award must first be paid to
of his lien and only the balance should
the mortgagee to the amount
2
be paid to the mortgagor.9
Where the state validly exercises its rights and powers under
eminent 'domain, the landowner who may have his right-of-way
51. 367 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
52. 3 POWELL, RPLF PioPERTY 602 (1952).
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access cut off may proceed against the county under a reverse
condemnation action 53 to recover damages.5 In Daniels v. Talent,55
a reverse condemnation action was brought against Lenoir City to
recover damages alleged to have been incurred by reason of an
agreement between defendant and the State of Tennessee concerning a road in front of complainant's property. The state highway
department had constructed a new highway through the city and
in so doing, with the cooperation of the city, had closed a portion
of the street passing along complainant's west property line. Thereafter the city abandoned and closed that portion of the street. The
complainant alleged that the ingress and egress to his property
was thereby impeded and the unsightly condition of the abandoned
property lowered the value of his property; the supreme court held,
however, that the complaint was insufficient to state a cause of action
against the city, inasmuch as it was not alleged that the city agreed
to do anything in its corporate capacity with respect to the construction of the highway. The general rule is that owners of lots
bordering upon public streets have a private easement of way in
the street (a right to ingress and egress to and from their property)
in addition to their general right to use it as a member of the public.
Interference with the use of this easement would, therefore, entitle
the owner to either legal or equitable relief.56 In fact, it has been
held that an abutting landowner's private easement had not been
affected by the resolution of a county road board relinquishing all
public rights in the road, requiring5 7 removal of obstructions placed
in the road by another landowner.
E. Procedural Problems
United States v. Pressnel,58 was a proceeding on an ex parte
motion of the United States in behalf of the Tennessee Valley
Authority to be relieved of minimal court costs assessed against it
in a prior condemnation suit. The United States contended that it
had sovereign immunity from having court costs taxed against it,
and inasmuch as TVA was a governmental corporation, it also was
immune. The court held, however, that since the real party in
interest was TVA, and since by the enabling legislation creating
TVA it was on an equal footing with private corporations, it could
53. TE x. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1423, -1424 (1956).
54. See Roady, Real Property-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 V~aND. L. REv. 1387, 1392

(1962).

55. 370 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. 1963).
56. Roady, Real Property-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1318, 1320
(1960).
57. Paschall v. Valentine, 45 Tenn. App. 131, 321 S.W.2d 586 (W.S. 1958).
58. 219 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
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have assessment directed against it by the courts. 59 Although land
of a government corporation is generally held subject to the same
rules as apply to other landowners under local law, 0 it is interesting
to note that this is the first time that TVA has paid court
costs in
61
its thirty year history of over 4,000 condemnation suits.
In another action for damages for the taking and injury of land,
the plaintiff-landowners had caused a- summons to be issued in
January 1962, against defendant for damages of 20,000 dollars.62
However, the petition which was in the form of a reverse condemnation suit was not filed until May, 1962. The plaintiffs had filed a
suit in 1959 for damages to their property, 63 but this was dismissed
in January, 1961, on grounds other than the merits. By statute,64
they had one year from the date of dismissal to refile. The court
held that the issuing of the summons within one year did not save
plaintiffs from the bar of the statute of limitations, since the clerk
of the court was without authority to issue the summons until the
petition had been filed.
In a federal eminent domain action, the Secretary of the Army
sought to condemn certain lands of defendant above the high watermark of Old Hickory Reservoir. 65 The condemnation was sought
by the Declaration of Taking Act of 193166 whereby the Secretary
of the Army is authorized to condemn land on a government reservoir above water as well as that below if it is for a public purpose.
Generally the government would either condemn the land or give
the landowner the option to waive severance damages and retain title
to the land above the high water mark. If the high water mark cut off
the access road to the property the government would then take the
whole tract as was the case here. The landowner in the instant case
was not given the option since he was mentally incompetent to
enter into a binding agreement, and on his death the suit was
revived by his heirs. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the landowner was not deprived of due process by his not being
offered the option since he was paid full value for the land, and that
the subsequent rental of the property to the Girl Scouts with a retained power of revocation did not amount to a taking of one person's
property for the benefit of another individual.
59. In reaching this decision, the court construed and applied Rule 54(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
60. 1 PowELL, REAL PRoPERTY 678 (1949).
61. 219 F. Supp. at 732.

62. Johnson v. Roane County, 370 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. 1963).
63. TEN. CODE: ANN. § 23-1424 (1956).
64. TENN. CODE Arr.§ 28-106 (1956).

65. United States v. Agee, 322 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1963).
66. 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1958).
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The legislation in the area of real property which is the product
of the Eighty-Third General Assembly signifies progressive thinking
on the part of the legislators. There were, of course, the usual
housekeeping duties of amendment, but they were few. One such
amendment to the section concerning the ten year maximum term of
oil and gas leases 67 excludes any lease or conveyance of underground natural gas storage rights. 68 The chapter on registration of
deeds 69 was amended so as to provide that where the governing body
of a metropolitan government has adopted an official property identification map, every deed offered for recording must show the number or other identifying symbol of the parcel of land as designated
in such map.70 Also, all such deeds offered for registration within
the area of a metropolitan government must show on the face of
the deed the correct mailing address of the new owner if it is
different from the address of the property as shown in the body of
the deed; and if the tax bills are to be sent to one other than the
owner, it also must be designated with the proper mailing address. 71
Another amendment was to the section providing for levy of a
warrant against the real property of a corporation for non-payment
of taxes when no personal property can be found to satisfy a distress
warrant.7 2 It provides that such property acquired by any officer
or stockholder from the corporation on dissolution or liquidation is
liable to attachment for the delinquent taxes of the corporation.73
One piece of major legislation in the area which was enacted
during the last general assembly was the Horizontal Property Act,7 4
which anticipates the growth of condominium apartments in the
state. The act provided for the creation of a "horizontal property
regime," an apartment building in which individual apartments
will be considered as separate parcels of real property to be conveyed and taxed as such. The act also provides for the administration of such apartments.
Two new acts were adopted in 1963 to aid in the work of the
water resource division of the Department of Conservation, created
in 1957.75 The first is a water registration act which requires all
persons or associations which withdraw fifty thousand gallons of
67. TEN.
68. TENN.

CODE ANN. § 64-704 (1956).
CODE: ANN. § 64-704 (Supp. 1964).
CODE ANN. §§ 64-2401 through -2412

69. TEEN.
(1955).
70. TEE . CODE ANN. § 64-2413 (Supp. 1964).
71. TENN.CODE ANN. § 64-2414 (Supp. 1964).
72. TENN.CODE ANNmx.
§ 67-2720 (1956).
73. TENN.CODE ANr. § 67-2720 (Supp. 1964).
74. T
.CODE ANN. §§ 64-2701 through -2722 (Supp. 1964).
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2001 (Supp. 1964).
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water per day from any source to register its use with the division of
water resources when required. Moreover, if one is using fifty thousand gallons of water per day and increases his use by ten per
cent, he must give notice to the division within thirty days.7 6 This
legislation is used to give the division of water resources a method
by which it can approximate the amount of water used in the state.
Another such act was the well drillers act 77 which provides that all
well drillers must register with and be licensed by the state.78 It is
also required that the well driller shall provide the Commissioner
of the Department of Conservation with a "log" of each well drilled,
that is, a record of the geological formations penetrated in the drilling of a water well.7 9 Such information, it is hoped, will in time
provide the Commissioner with sufficient information of the geological formations of the state to validly predict the movements of
underground waters. These two acts concerning water use show a
growing understanding on the part of Tennessee legislators that the
state does have problems in the field of water use, and that in order
to develop the water use of the state most beneficially, water legislation is sometimes needed.
76.

TENN. CODE ANN.
770-2005 (Supp. 1964).
77. TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 70-2301 through -2310 (Supp. 1964).
78. TENN. CODE ANx. § 70-2302 (Supp. 1964).
79. TE NN. CODE. ANN. § 70-2303 (Supp. 1964).

